The Kennedy Administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962

The CIA thinks that support material began to gravel in Cuba in early-September, with projectiles arriving somewhat later (Pachter, 1963).

Medium-range Soviet missiles in Cuba did not constitute a threat to the US. The Administration, however, felt that longrange Soviet missiles in Cuba did pose a threat to American cities, although precise "few American experts . . . feared" that the Soviets would threaten American cities (Pachter, 1963, p. 7). Although the Kennedy Administration claimed that Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Cuba were capable of destroying every ma]or city in the unify provinces, most informed opinion simply did not sustain (Pachter, 1963). Even Aviation Week (1962), a periodical strongly supportive of national defense issues, stated that the Soviet missiles should be called not IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles), but PRBMs (political-range ballistic missiles). president Kennedy (1962, p. 898), however, verbalize that the missiles "would have appeared to" change the strategic balance, and that "appearances contribute to reality."

Domestic political sympathies in the US also provided an issue during the Cuban missile crisis. The press and the Republicans in Congress were, in September 1962, accusive President Kennedy of inaction and indifference in the face of a Soviet military build-up near to the US (Pachter, 1963). With mid-term cong

2. Berlin: The Soviets were pressuring the United States on Berlin. Khruschev issued an ultimatum, in which the Soviet end of granting full recognition to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or East Germany, was outlined (Rostow, 1964). This issue was of exceptional significance, because of the implication that a GDR government would or could abrogate Western Allied rights in and access to Berlin (Pachter, 1963). There were strong indications in 1962 that the Soviets wanted to connective the Berlin and Cuban issues.

In such a linkage, a trade-off would see the Western Allies granting Soviet demands in Berlin, firearm the Soviets would abandon the Castro government, and would not intercede should the US move to tump over the Cuban government through military action (Pachter, 1963).

7. Turkey. With honour to Turkey, the Soviets wanted the Americans to abandon their Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in that country (Detzer, 1979). From the Soviet perspective, the American bases in Turkey were like to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

1. President Kennedy: The president believed in coexistence by negotiation, and serious explorations of the interests of the other side (Pachter, 1963).

10. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson: Acheson was a hard-liner.

5. Vice President Johnson: The Vice President was included in the grouping as a consequence of his office. He was not, however, either asked or expected to play a major role in War Council deliberations (Pachter, 1963).

The crisis management group included senior personnel from the White House, the State Department, and the justification Department. The members of the group were as follows:

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